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"CARVING AT THE JOINT": THE PRECISE
FUNCTION OF RULE 23(c)(4)
Patricia Bronte,* George Robot,** and Darin M. Williams***
INTRODUCTION
Most leading scholars agree that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(c)(4) permits a class action to be certified for particular issues that
meet the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b), even if other portions
of the action would not qualify for class treatment.' Nevertheless,
some commentators and practitioners, relying primarily on dicta from
two Fifth Circuit decisions,2 posit a "circuit split" regarding the inter-
pretation of Rule 23(c)(4) and dispute the propriety of certifying issue
classes or subclasses.3 Yet, while the Fifth Circuit has referred to Rule
23(c)(4) as a mere "housekeeping" measure that district courts may
consider only after finding that the cause of action as a whole has met
the requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b), 4 all other circuits that have
considered this question have rejected the Fifth Circuit approach to
issue classes.5 Moreover, the most recent Fifth Circuit decisions
demonstrate that the weak "circuit split" occasioned by Castano v.
* Member, Bronte Law LLC.
** Partner, Stowell & Friedman, Ltd.
*** J.D. Candidate 2013, DePaul University College of Law.
1. See, e.g., 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1790 (3d ed. 2005); 8 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 24:24 (4th ed. 2002); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.17 (3d ed.
1995).
2. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745-46 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996); Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998).
3. See, e.g., Laura Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567
(2004); Mark A. Perry, Issue Certification Under Rule 23(c)(4): A Reappraisal, 62 DEPAUL L.
REV. 733 (2012). It should be noted, however, that many of those that disagree with the consen-
sus interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) are advocates on behalf of defendants resisting class certifica-
tion-Laura Hines, for example, represented Philip Morris in Castano, 84 F.3d 734, and Mark
Perry represented Wal-Mart in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
4. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 745-46 n.21.
5. See, e.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2011); Williams v.
Mohawk Indus., 568 F.3d 1350, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases,
461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2006); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir.
2003); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003); Mejdrech v. Met-
Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2003); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d
1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996).
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American Tobacco Co. and Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. has all
but vanished,6 leaving the federal circuits unanimous in holding that
Rule 23(c)(4) authorizes certification of issue classes when the com-
mon, certified issues are pivotal to the entire claim and "carved at the
joint" rather than enmeshed with individual issues.7
The Seventh Circuit's recent interlocutory decision in McReynolds
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. illustrates these class
action principles. 8 In McReynolds, the Seventh Circuit certified a
class under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4) to determine whether a retail
brokerage firm's account distribution and teaming policies have a dis-
parate impact on African-American brokers (financial advisors) and,
if so, whether the policies are justified by a business necessity.9 In a
decision authored by Judge Posner, the court explained that a finding
of disparate impact liability would necessitate individual trials to de-
termine the actual effect of firm policies on specific class members, yet
emphasized that "at least it wouldn't be necessary in each of those
trials to determine whether the challenged practices were unlawful." 10
This Seventh Circuit opinion represents the ideal approach to issue
class certification because it "advances the fundamental goal of Rule
23 itself; that is, [it] advances a fair and judicially efficient disposition
of the entire action, even if it does not completely resolve the ac-
6. See, e.g., In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 369 n.13 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The bankruptcy court's
limited grant of class certification is especially appropriate because 'a court should certify a class
on a claim-by-claim basis .... ' (quoting Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th
Cir. 2000))); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 626-29 (5th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that an issue class met predominance and superiority when certified issues were "not only
significant but also pivotal" despite individualized issues of causation, comparative negligence,
and damages).
7. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir.
2012) ("'Class action treatment is appropriate and is permitted by Rule 23 when the judicial
economy from consolidation of separate claims outweighs any concern with possible inaccuracies
from their being lumped together in a single proceeding for decision by a single judge or jury.
Often ... these competing considerations can be reconciled ... by carving at the joints of the
parties' dispute. If there are genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants,
issues moreover the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by repeated
proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially when the class is large, to resolve those issues
in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-specific issues to individual follow-on
proceedings."' (emphasis added) (quoting Mejdrech, 319 F.3d at 911)).
8. See Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Experts Say Recent Seventh Circuit Ruling May Not Make 'Issue
Certification' Trendy, in 13 CLASS ACTION LITIGATION REPORT 284, 284 (2012) (quoting Profes-
sor John C. Coffee, Jr.'s statement that the ruling in McReynolds is "an encouraging decision by
Judge Posner" that demonstrates the judicious use of issue certification).
9. See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490 ("The only issue at this stage is whether the plaintiffs'
claim of disparate impact is most efficiently determined on a classwide basis rather than in 700
individual lawsuits." (emphasis added)).
10. Id. at 491.
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tion." 11 Consequently, even if Fifth Circuit dicta once created a cir-
cuit split regarding the proper use of issue certification, that dicta
should be disregarded in favor of the well-reasoned, judicious analysis
of the Seventh Circuit.
II. FIFTH CIRCUIT DICTA AND THE SEMANTICS OF THE ISSUE
CLASS "CIRCUIT SPLIT"
The notion that issue classes should be certified only as a "house-
keeping" measure stems specifically from a footnote in Castano v.
American Tobacco Co.12 and a divided opinion in Allison v. Citgo Pe-
troleum Corp.'3 Therefore, a review of these decisions is the first step
in analyzing the issue class "circuit split." When the dicta that gave
rise to this split is viewed in context, it is clear that the divide between
the Fifth Circuit and all other circuits is much more semantic than
real.14
A. Castano v. American Tobacco Co.: The Origin of the
"Circuit Split"
The unique facts of Castano undoubtedly dictated the outcome in
that case. "In what may [have been] the largest class action ever at-
tempted in federal court,' 5 the district court certified a "Franken-
stein's monster"'16 class of all Americans addicted to nicotine (and
their heirs) during the prior half century. The court conditionally cer-
tified for class jury trials the issues of both "core liability," which re-
sulted from the tobacco industry's conduct, and punitive damages.
They did not, however, certify the issues of injury-in-fact, proximate
cause, reliance, comparative negligence, affirmative defenses, or com-
pensatory damages.' 7 The plaintiffs asserted nine different causes of
action based on a "novel and wholly untested theory" of liability that
would be governed by the law of all fifty states. 8 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that
the requirements of predominance and superiority were met, particu-
11. Janet C. Evans & Kari Thoe Crone, Much Ado About Nothing?: The Quarrel over Pre-
dominance in Issue Certification, in ABA SECrION OF LITIGATION, CLASS AcrIONs TODAY 26,
26 (2008).
12. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745-46 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
13. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998).
14. See, e.g., Evans & Crone, supra note 11.
15. Castano, 84 F.3d at 737.
16. Id. at 745 n.19 (quoting Letter from Charles Alan Wright, Professor, University of Texas,
to N. Reid Neureiter, Associate, Williams & Connolly LLC (Dec. 22, 1994)).
17. See id. at 738-39.
18. See id. at 737.
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larly given that the court would be required to guess how fifty states'
laws would apply to the plaintiffs' novel legal theory.19 In a footnote
often quoted as support for the issue class circuit split, the Fifth Cir-
cuit classified Rule 23(c)(4) as a "housekeeping" measure:
Severing the defendants' conduct from reliance under [R]ule
23(c)(4) does not save the class action. A district court cannot man-
ufacture predominance through the nimble use of subdivision
(c)(4). The proper interpretation of the interaction between subdi-
visions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a whole, must
satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a
housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever common issues for a
class trial.20
In its reasoning, the Castano court followed the analysis of an ear-
lier Seventh Circuit decision-In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.21-that
had similarly reversed issue certification. 22 Rhone-Poulenc was a mass
tort action brought on behalf of thousands of hemophiliacs who had
contracted AIDS through blood transfusions. 23 Like Castano, Rhone-
Poulenc involved a huge putative class asserting a novel theory of lia-
bility, governed by the law of fifty states, which threatened the de-
fendants with potentially catastrophic liability exposure. 24 Only
thirteen cases had been tried under the plaintiffs' theory, of which the
defendants had won twelve.25 The district court had certified the issue
of defendants' negligence for a single class jury trial, leaving class
members to file separate actions to litigate the overlapping issue of
comparative negligence before separate juries around the country.26
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in trying to sepa-
rate the issue of the defendants' negligence from the plaintiffs' com-
parative negligence because issues certified under Rule 23(c)(4) must
be "carve[d] at the joint" of the elements of the claim so that "the
same issue is [not] reexamined by different juries. '27
Notwithstanding the dicta from the footnote, the Castano court
quoted and adopted Rhone-Poulenc's "carve at the joint" standard for
19. See id. at 737, 741-44.
20. Id. at 745-46 n.21.
21. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
22. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 741, 746-47 nn.22-23, 748, 750-51; see also W. Russell Taber, The
Reexamination Clause: Exploring Bifurcation in Mass Tort Litigation, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 63, 66
(2006) (noting that Castano followed the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Rhone-
Poulenc).
23. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1294.
24. Id. at 1294-98.
25. Id. at 1296.
26. Id. at 1297.
27. Id. at 1302-03.
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issue certification.28 Carving at the joints of a substantive claim pre-
vents Rule 23(c)(4) from being used to manufacture predominance by
peeling off individual issues until only common subissues remain. In
fact, as a result of its practicality, this approach has been adopted in
other circuits as well.29 Viewed in this light, it is far from clear that
the Castano footnote rises to the level of a "circuit split."
B. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.: The "Widening" of the
"Circuit Split"
According to some commentators, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Al-
lison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. expanded the issue class divide be-
tween the circuits. 30 Yet, as with Castano, reasoned scrutiny of the
Allison opinion demonstrates the weakness of this assertion. In Al-
lison, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit relied on both Rhone-
Poulenc and Castano in affirming the district court's decision to utilize
consolidation under Rule 42, rather than class certification under Rule
23, in an employment discrimination action.31 The Allison plaintiffs
sought compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of more than
1,000 employees "working in seven different departments, and alleg-
ing discrimination over a period of nearly twenty years. ' 32 The plain-
tiffs had asked the court to certify their disparate impact claim, while
holding in abeyance their request to certify the pattern-or-practice
claim and the compensatory and punitive damages claims pending the
outcome of the disparate impact class trial.33 The Allison majority dis-
approved of this piecemeal approach to class certification and noted
that the entire disparate impact claim could not be certified because,
like the pattern-or-practice claim, it would require a finding that each
class member was harmed by the challenged employment practices. 34
Because the pattern-or-practice claim would be tried to a jury, it could
not be held in abeyance while the class proceeded to judgment on the
disparate impact claim.35
28. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750-51 (5th Cir. 1996).
29. See, e.g., Gates v. Rohm & Hass Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the rigidly
sequential approach enunciated in the Castano footnote and endorsing the same "carve at the
joints" standard for forming issue classes as the Fifth and Seventh Circuits).
30. Cf Paul Karlsgodt, Supreme Court Declines to Take on the Issue of Issue Certification,
CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT DEF. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.classactionlawsuitdefense.com/2012/
10/10/supreme-court-declines-to-take-on-the-issue-of-issue-certification.
31. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1998).
32. Id. at 419-20.
33. Id. at 420-21.
34. Id. at 424.
35. Id.
2013]
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Nonetheless, in response to a request for rehearing, the Allison ma-
jority issued a statement qualifying its decision:
The trial court utilized consolidation under [R]ule 42 rather than
class certification under [R]ule 23 to manage this case. We review
that decision for abuse of discretion and we find no abuse in this
case. We are not called upon to decide whether the district court
would have abused its discretion if it had elected to bifurcate liabil-
ity issues that are common to the class and to certify for class deter-
mination those discreet liability issues.36
This statement casts doubt on the status of the panel majority's opin-
ion regarding issue certification. At a minimum, the majority's re-
hearing statement rendered Allison dicta with respect to a case in
which the court does bifurcate liability issues that are common to the
class and certify for class determination the discrete issues of class-
wide disparate impact liability and injunctive relief.37
III. ANY "CIRCUIT SPLIT" SURROUNDING RULE 23(c)(4) ISSUE
CERTIFICATION HAS DISAPPEARED
The foregoing discussion reveals that, even at its outset, the issue
class "circuit split" was tenuous. In fact, under Castano and Allison,
the Fifth Circuit would likely certify an issue class like the one certi-
fied by the Seventh Circuit in McReynolds.38 But assuming that these
Fifth Circuit decisions did create a circuit split, it may now be safely
disregarded for at least two additional reasons. First, the language of
and recent amendments to Rule 23 unequivocally support utilizing is-
sue classes when doing so promotes the efficiency of the litigation.
Secondly, more recent Fifth Circuit decisions interpret Rule 23(c) in
accordance with both the consensus view of the other circuits and the
language and history of the rule.
A. The Plain Meaning, Purpose, and Recent History of
Rule 23(c) (4)
Rule 23(c)(4) provides, "When appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular is-
sues."'39 For example, issue class actions are appropriate for determin-
36. Id. at 434.
37. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 490
(7th Cir. 2012); see also infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
38. See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490; see also Evans & Crone, supra note 11, at 28 ("Both
before and after Castano, the courts certified issue, or partial, class actions only after concluding
that it was both manageable and beneficial to the entire action to do so."); see also supra notes
14-37 and accompanying text.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
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ing liability in actions in which the need for individualized damages
determinations would otherwise defeat predominance:
This provision recognizes that an action may be maintained as a
class action as to particular issues only. For example, in a fraud or
similar case the action may retain its "class" character only through
the adjudication of liability to the class; the members of the class
may thereafter be required to come in individually and prove the
amounts of their respective claims. 40
In addition, the recent rule-making history of Rule 23 demonstrates
that it was intended as much more than a simple "housekeeping rule."
Prior to 2007, Rule 23(c)(4) governed both issue classes and sub-
classes. This prior formulation of the rule specified that, in consider-
ing whether to certify an issue class, a court should apply the
requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b) to the particular issue class or
subclass, not to the cause of action as a whole: "When appropriate (A)
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect
to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall
then be construed and applied accordingly."'4 1
This application of the Rule aligns with the purpose of subclasses
because, as mentioned above, a class as a whole often includes mem-
bers with divergent interests. In the case of such divergent interests,
class members could rarely, if ever, satisfy the requirements of typical-
ity and adequacy of representation except through the use of sub-
classes.42 Accordingly, limiting the use of Rule 23(c)(4) to cases that
qualify for class treatment as a whole would render authorization of
issue classes and subclasses superfluous, if not meaningless. 43
To further emphasize the point, as part of the 2007 Style Project to
clarify and simplify the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the issue
class and subclass provisions were split into consecutive subdivisions:
(4) Particular Issues. When appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues.
(5) Subclasses. When appropriate, a class may be divided into
subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.44
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
41. Memorandum from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory-Comm. on Fed. Rules of CivilProcedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (July
20, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir.
2003).
. 42. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997).
43. See Gunnells, 348 F.3d at 439-40.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
2013]
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At the same time, the concluding phrase of the former Rule
23(c)(4)-"and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly"-was deleted. 45 As the committee notes to the
2007 amendment explain, however, this amendment effected no sub-
stantive change in Rule 23(c)(4): "These changes are intended to be
stylistic only .... As part of the general restyling, intensifiers that
provide emphasis but add no meaning are consistently deleted. '46
This amendment to Rule 23 renders its language plain and clear-
particular issues and subclasses that meet the requirements of Rules
23(a) and (b) may be certified for class action treatment, even if the
action as a whole could not.
B. Recent Fifth Circuit Cases Mark the End of the "Circuit Split"
Recent decisions confirm that the Fifth Circuit is in accord with the
consensus view of the other circuits, as well as the language and his-
tory of Rule 23(c)(4). For example, in Mullen v. Treasure Chest Ca-
sino, LLC, decided only one year after Allison, the Fifth Circuit
certified an issue class without requiring that the class as a whole meet
predominance, thus resolving the "circuit split" on its own accord. 47
Furthermore, Robertson v. Monsanto Co.-an unpublished, per
curiam opinion-described a liability issue class followed by individ-
ual proceedings on causation and damages as "the 'usual' class action
method of resolving mass-tort claims."'48
Indeed, shortly after the Seventh Circuit's most recent decision in
McReynolds,49 the Fifth Circuit, in M.D. v. Perry, held that a putative
class lacking Rule 23(a)(2) commonality and Rule 23(b)(2) cohesive-
ness could nevertheless be certified through subclasses under Rule
23(c)(5), the companion provision to Rule 23(c)(4), as long as the
claims of each subclass (not the action as a whole) met the require-
ments of Rules 23(a) and (b). 50 The Perry court vacated an order cer-
tifying a class of all children who are, or will later be, in Texas's foster
care system because the plaintiffs failed to establish commonality of
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) advisory committee's note.
47. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 482, 626-29 (5th Cir. 1999)
(certifying certain common liability issues under federal law despite the need for follow-on jury
trials to decide causation, damages, and comparative negligence).
48. Robertson v. Monsanto Co., 287 Fed. App'x 354, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted).
49. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012).
50. See M.D. v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 848-49 (5th Cir. 2012).
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issues and class cohesiveness.5 1 Although the "'amorphous' super-
claim" as a whole did not qualify for class treatment, the Fifth Circuit
held that the district court could, on remand, consider certification of
subclasses. 52 Whether subclasses are appropriate, the Fifth Circuit
held, should be analyzed by the claims of individual subclasses rather
than the action as a whole.53
As discussed above, issue classes and subclasses are governed by
parallel, consecutive provisions of Rule 23(c) that were once joined in
Rule 23(c)(4), but later divided in a stylistic, nonsubstantive revision
of the rules. As such, there is no principled reason to differentiate
between issue classes and subclasses in their relationship to the re-
quirements of Rules 23(a) and (b). Accordingly, Perry signals a shift
in the Fifth Circuit toward the view of the consensus jurisdictions in
its approach to Rule 23(c).
Even more recently, in In re Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the certification of a narrow Rule 23(b)(2) class after the bankruptcy
court redefined the class in accordance with Rule 23(c)(4). 54 In that
case, a putative class of debtors alleged that their mortgage servicer
charged fees in violation of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure and sought injunctive relief as well as damages. 55 Upon hearing
the motion for class certification, the bankruptcy court denied certifi-
cation of the Rule 23(b)(3) and Rule 23(b)(2) classes for the debtors'
damages claims.56 However, the court granted the narrow certifica-
tion of an injunctive relief class to determine whether the mortgage
servicer could collect certain unapproved fees.57
The Fifth Circuit upheld the certification of this narrow class, find-
ing that the charge of allegedly unauthorized fees was a "common be-
havior... that led to the class members allegedly being harmed in the
same way."'58 The court reasoned that after a classwide decision on
injunctive relief, the issue of "whether [the mortgage servicer] must
seek Court approval for fees that it imposes" would be "resolved as to
all class members. ' 59 More importantly, the Fifth Circuit recognized
the utility of Rule 23(c)(4), noting that the Rule "explicitly recognizes
51. Id. at 841-43, 846, 849.
52. Id. at 848.
53. Id. at 848-49.
54. In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d 360, 367 n.8 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting the propriety of the bank-
ruptcy court's redefined "single-issue injunctive class").
55. Id. at 362-63.
56. Id. at 363.
57. Id. at 363-64.
58. Id. at 365.
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
2013]
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the flexibility that courts need in class certification by allowing certifi-
cation with respect to particular issues and division of the class into
subclasses. '60 Because the In re Rodriguez court affirmed an issue
class that the bankruptcy court carved out, this case firmly establishes
that the Fifth Circuit has joined the consensus regarding Rule 23(c).
IV. MCREYNOLDS V. MERRILL LYNCH. THE EPITOME OF ISSUE
CLASS CERTIFICATION
McReynolds is a particularly interesting case because it thoroughly
illustrates how a court can carve at the joint under Rule 23(c)(4). The
plaintiffs in that case consist of a class of 700 African-American finan-
cial advisors who allege that their employer, Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, discriminated and continues to discriminate against
them in violation of Title VII. Specifically, the employee class alleges
that certain company policies have a disparate impact on African-
American financial advisors, which results in their being compensated
significantly less than similarly situated, white financial advisors. The
Seventh Circuit framed the details of the company policies as follows:
Merrill Lynch ... delegates discretion over decisions that influ-
ence the compensation of all the company's 15,000 brokers ("Finan-
cial Advisors" is their official title) to 135 "Complex Directors."
Each of the Complex Directors supervises several of the company's
600 branch offices, and within each branch office the brokers exer-
cise a good deal of autonomy, though only within a framework es-
tablished by the company.
Two elements of that framework are challenged: the company's
"teaming" policy and its "account distribution" policy. The teaming
policy permits brokers in the same office to form teams .... and the
aim in forming or joining a team is to gain access to additional cli-
ents ....
The teams are formed by brokers, and once formed a team de-
cides whom to admit as a new member. Complex Directors and
branch-office managers do not select the team's members.
Account distributions are transfers of customers' accounts when a
broker leaves Merrill Lynch and his clients' accounts must therefore
be transferred to other brokers. Accounts are transferred within a
branch office, and the brokers in that office compete for the ac-
counts. The company establishes criteria for deciding who will win
the competition. The criteria include the competing brokers'
records of revenue generated for the company and of the number
and investments of clients retained.
... [A manager's] exercise of ... discretion is influenced by the
two company-wide policies at issue: authorization to brokers, rather
60. In re Rodriguez, 695 F.3d at 369 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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than managers, to form and staff teams; and basing account distri-
butions on the past success of the brokers who are competing for
the transfers. Furthermore, team participation and account distri-
bution can affect a broker's performance evaluation, which under
company policy influences the broker's pay and promotion. The
plaintiffs argue that these company-wide policies exacerbate racial
discrimination by brokers.
The teams, they say, are little fraternities (our term but their
meaning), and as in fraternities the brokers choose as team mem-
bers people who are like themselves. If they are white, they, or
some of them anyway, are more comfortable teaming with other
white brokers .... [T]here is bound to be uncertainty about who
will be effective in bringing and keeping shared clients; and when
there is uncertainty people tend to base decisions on emotions and
preconceptions, for want of objective criteria. 6'
As noted, Merrill Lynch's account distribution policy establishes
specific criteria for distributing the accounts of brokers who leave the
firm to the remaining brokers. "The criteria include the competing
brokers' records of revenue generated for the company and of the
number and investments of clients retained"-records that may be
distorted by prior account distributions and teaming opportunities
from which African-American brokers were disproportionately ex-
cluded. As a result, Merrill Lynch's policies can create a "vicious cy-
cle" that compounds the disadvantages for African-Americans:
A portion of a team's pre-existing revenues are transferred within a
team to a new recruit, who thus starts out with that much "new"
revenue credited to him or her-an advantage, over anyone who is
not on a team and thus must generate all of his own "new" revenue,
that translates into a larger share of account distributions, which in
turn helps the broker do well in the next round of such distributions.
This spiral effect attributable to company-wide policy and arguably
disadvantageous to black brokers presents another question com-
mon to the class, along with the question whether, if the team-in-
flected account distribution system does have this disparate impact,
it nevertheless is justified by business necessity. 62
In reversing the judgment of the district court, which had denied class
certification, the circuit court explained, "The incremental causal ef-
fect (overlooked by the district judge) of those company-wide poli-
cies-which is the alleged disparate impact-could be most efficiently
determined on a classwide basis."'63
61. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488-89 (7th Cir.
2012).
62. Id. at 490.
63. Id.
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On remand, the district court found that the proposed disparate im-
pact class met the elements of Rule 23(a), as well as Rules 23(c)(4)
and 23(b)(2). 64 Accordingly, it issued a Class Certification Order,
which certified a class action "limited to determining the issues of: (i)
whether Defendant's teaming and/or account distribution policies
have or had an unlawful disparate impact on the certified class; and
(ii) if so, the appropriateness of any classwide final injunctive and cor-
responding declaratory relief. '65
The same commentators who argue that an issue class circuit split
exists among the federal circuit courts also argue that the issue class in
McReynolds was improperly certified. Essentially, their contention is
that the class fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) because
it is not clear, on an individual basis, whether the compensation of
black financial advisors was disparately impacted by the company's
policies. Nevertheless, the specific calculation of compensation per
broker was not at issue in the Seventh Circuit's opinion; rather, the
only issue was "whether the plaintiffs' claim of disparate impact is
most efficiently determined on a classwide basis rather than in 700
individual lawsuits."'66 As the court aptly stated, "There isn't any fea-
sible method-certainly none has been proposed in this case-for
withholding injunctive relief until a series of separate injunctive ac-
tions has yielded a consensus for or against the plaintiffs. ' 67
Looking forward, the court noted that if disparate impact is found
and there are no common issues regarding pecuniary relief, the plain-
tiffs' monetary claims would have to be pursued individually, 68 but
that the individual follow-on trials would be much more efficient if
"the question whether Merrill Lynch has violated the antidiscrimina-
tion statutes" does not have to be "determined anew in each case. '69
Even accepting for the sake of argument that the circuits were di-
vided on the appropriate use of issue classes when the Seventh Circuit
decided McReynolds, the court's studied application of Rule 23 in that
opinion is, on its own merits, sufficient to abolish the circuit split alto-
64. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 05 C 6583, 2012 WL
5278555 (N.D. I11. July 13, 2012).
65. Id.
66. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 490.
67. Id. at 491.
68. Id. at 492 ("The stakes in each of the plaintiffs' claims are great enough to make individual
suits feasible. Most of Merrill Lynch's brokers earn at least $100,000 a year, and many earn
much more, and the individual claims involve multiple years.").
69. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit did not decide how any follow-on trials should be adju-
dicated, leaving that issue for the district court on remand. Given the interlocutory nature of its
ruling, the Seventh Circuit took no position on who should adjudicate these separate suits-a
jury, a judge, or a special master. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (2006).
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gether. In the face of numerous and multifaceted facts, the Seventh
Circuit deftly used Rule 23(c)(4) to promote judicial efficiency-
which is, after all, the purpose of the Rule-by separating an essential
issue from the tangle of common class claims, all the while preserving
the due process rights of both parties. 70 Consequently, in addition to
being properly decided, the McReynolds opinion actually exemplifies
the ideal application of Rule 23(c)(4).
V. CONCLUSION
The certification of issue classes, whether in the Fifth Circuit or in
the remaining "consensus" jurisdictions, depends on the factual cir-
cumstances surrounding the proposed issue class, not the particular
gloss the court puts on Rule 23(c)(4). This analysis not only invali-
dates the purported "circuit split," but also comports with both the
language and the purpose of Rule 23.
Even after the McReynolds decision, some commentators focus on
the "circuit split"71 or otherwise seek to undercut the utility of Rule
23(c)(4). 72 Yet, McReynolds did not violate the provisions Rule 23 by
breaking off "claims" or "defenses"-if it had, the Supreme Court
would not have declined certiorari in the case. Indeed, the focus
should be on what the Seventh Circuit got right in the McReynolds
decision. The court did not create a dramatic new interpretation of
Rule 23(c)(4), but rather used the Rule in the way it was meant to be
used to promote judicial efficiency. In other words, the court imple-
mented an often overlooked class action mechanism to carve out the
issue of an employer's liability for disparate impact discrimination and
simplify the case as a whole while driving at the heart of the purpose
of Title VII.
Given the fact sensitivity of the issue class inquiry, some variation
among courts is inevitable. 73 However, such variance, without investi-
gation of its cause, does not necessarily support the conclusion that
70. Under the Seventh Circuit's decision, Merrill Lynch remains free to ask for a jury trial in
any follow-on trials.
71. See Karlsgodt, supra note 30 ("The federal circuits are split on whether issue certification
is allowed to resolve discrete issues short of a full claim.").
72. See Perry, supra note 3, at 741-43 ("How can 'liability' be established without allowing
plaintiffs to prove reliance, causation, or other elements of their claim? How can 'liability' be
established without allowing defendants to prove their affirmative defenses?").
73. For instance, the Fifth Circuit has approved issue classes despite the presence of significant
issues requiring individualized determination-like causation, comparative fault, and damages-
while circuit courts in the "consensus" jurisdictions have rejected issue classes in a variety of
other circumstances. Compare Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 626-29 (5th
Cir. 1999) (certifying certain common liability issues under federal law despite the need for fol-
low-on jury trials to decide causation, damages, and comparative negligence), with McLaughlin
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dissension exists among courts. Indeed, the Supreme Court's silence
on the matter simply bears out the fact that there is no circuit split.74
Just last year, after granting certiorari in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari seeking re-
view of a class action certified for certain consumer liability issues
under Rule 23(b)(3) in which the issues of causation, damages, and
statute of limitations were left to individual proceedings. 75
In sum, a fifteen-year-old footnote has no bearing on the issue class
analysis. 76 The "circuit split" regarding Rule 23(c)(4) was artificial
from the beginning and, in any case, has now been adequately re-
solved. As embodied in McReynolds, all circuits unanimously hold
that Rule 23(c)(4) authorizes certification of an issue class or subclass
when the common, certified issues are pivotal to the entire claim and
"carved at the joint."
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 221-34 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing issue class certification be-
cause of individualized issues of reliance, injury, damages, and statute of limitations).
74. The Supreme Court has previously considered and denied myriad petitions for certiorari
involving issue classes. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int'l, 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)
(holding that individualized relief hearings "need not defeat class treatment of the question
whether the defendants violated RICO"), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1051 (2005); Gunnells v Health-
plan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 421 (affirming an issue class to determine whether an administra-
tor mismanaged a health plan and contributed to its collapse, while reserving damages issues for
individual trials), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 915-16 (2004); Mullen, 186 F.3d at 622 (affirming certifi-
cation of common liability issues of federal claims triable by a jury, to be followed by individual
jury trials on causation, damages, and comparative negligence), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1159
(2000); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302-04 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing class
certification of a negligence issue in an immature tort theory, in which the district court failed to
"carve at the joint" in severing common issues from overlapping issues to be tried individually),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
75. Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 998
(2011).
76. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745-46 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).
